# **De-anonymization Attacks on Metaverse**

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May, 2023



### OUTLINE

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**Evaluations** 

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# Background

### **VR-driven Metaverse**

□ Immerse experience & Advanced human-computer interaction

#### Undergoing rapid growth of market size



VR scenario<sup>1,2</sup>

- 1. <u>https://up.enterdesk.com/edpic/bf/a2/91/bfa2919485d524f1477e06ba82a7e7bb.jpg</u>
- 2. <u>https://image11.m1905.cn/uploadfile/2018/0323/20180323091601495478.jpg</u>
- 3. https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/virtual-reality-vr-market



Global Market: \$28.4 Billion (2022)<sup>3</sup> CAGR: 13.8% (2023-2030)

# **Anonymization in VR**

User's real identity is masked by *avatar* 

Avatar: a digital representation of the user in the virtual world



Convert real user to avatar





Various avatars in VR<sup>1,2</sup>

1. https://news.zol.com.cn/764/7647534.html

2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWLPw4RE9Ig&t=18s

# **Anonymization in VR**

User's real identity is masked by *avatar* 

Avatar: a digital representation of the user in the virtual world



link user's real identity to his/her avatar?

# **Existing De-anonymization Attacks in VR**

#### **Traffic** analysis solution

#### □ Side-channel attack based on **sensor** information





OVRSeen: traffic analysis (Trimananda et al, USENIX Security'22)

Face-Mic (Shi et al, MobiCom'22)

# **Existing De-anonymization Attacks in VR**

#### □ **Traffic** analysis solution

#### □ Side-channel attack based on **sensor** information



# □ Is it possible for the external attacker to perform a de-anonymization without requiring any permission?

□ Attack scenario: tracking users in *avatar-changeable* VR games or meetings





# Motivation

# **Basic Insight**



■ No matter how avatars are changes, the inherent and unique movement patterns are relatively stable

# **Validation of Insight**

 $\Box$  Two users, same avatars  $\rightarrow$  Different patterns  $\rightarrow$  Different features

#### $\Box \text{Different avatars} \rightarrow \text{Stable features}$



### Attack model

Our proposed attack system: AvatarHunter



![](_page_13_Picture_0.jpeg)

# **System Design**

# **System Overflow of AvatarHunter**

AvatarHunter consists of four modules:

- □ Attack Initialization
- Data Pre-processing
- □ Feature Extraction
- □ Identity Inference

![](_page_14_Figure_6.jpeg)

# **Attack Initialization & Pre-processing**

![](_page_15_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Firstly, directly using existing gait recognition solution (i.e.,
  - GaitSet [1] in this study)
- $\Box \sqrt{}$  Appearance signature
- **X** Movement signature

[1] Chao et al., "Gaitset: Cross-view gait recognition through utilizing gait as a deep set," IEEE TPAMI, vol. 44, no. 7, pp. 3467–3478, 2022.

![](_page_16_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_17_Figure_1.jpeg)

18

![](_page_18_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### □ Unity-based solution

#### □ Various avatars

![](_page_19_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Figure_5.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Picture_6.jpeg)

(b)

![](_page_19_Picture_7.jpeg)

(c)

![](_page_19_Picture_8.jpeg)

(d)

1

288°

![](_page_20_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### □ Performance Improvement

□ From appearance feature to movement signature

![](_page_20_Figure_4.jpeg)

# **Identity Inference**

![](_page_21_Figure_1.jpeg)

Classification model:

□ Pre-collected Gallery vs Test Datasets

**□**Random Forest based method

![](_page_22_Picture_0.jpeg)

#### **Evaluations**

### **Dataset Construction**

Experimental Platform

**D**VR device: Meta Oculus Quest 2

 $\square$  VR applications: VRChat<sup>1</sup>

![](_page_23_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_5.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_6.jpeg)

VRChat

### **Dataset Construction**

□ 10 Users, 10 Avatars, 4 cameras

□ Total 1000 trials (video clips)

**Gallery:** Testing = 3:7

![](_page_24_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Picture_5.jpeg)

10 Users

![](_page_24_Picture_7.jpeg)

#### Views from 4 cameras

### **Overall Performance**

Closed-world avatar setting: 92.1%

□ Open-world avatar setting: 66.9%

AvatarHunter (66.9%) vs BenchMark (29.7%)

![](_page_25_Figure_4.jpeg)

# **Impact of Various Factors**

Length of Recording Video

Frame length	10	20	30	60	90
ASR in scenario-1 (%)	87.0	91.6	92.1	93.0	93.4
ASR in scenario-2 (%)	63.6	65.3	66.9	65.9	65.0

□ Gallery Size

Gallery size	10%	30%	50%	70%	90%
ASR in scenario-1 (%)	78.8	92.1	94.6	94.0	98.0
ASR in scenario-2 (%)	63.0	66.9	64.0	62.7	66.0

Camera Number

Camera combination	F	FB	FR	FRL	FBRL
ASR in scenario-1 (%)	72.9	90.1	91.9	88.4	92.1
ASR in scenario-2 (%)	51.3	62.3	68.6	66.4	66.9

![](_page_27_Picture_0.jpeg)

#### Discussions

### Countermeasures

Detecting Suspicious Users in VR

![](_page_28_Picture_2.jpeg)

#### □ Adding Noises during Avatar Generation

![](_page_28_Picture_4.jpeg)

Restricted access control (invite uses they trust)

### Limitations

#### □ Not Suitable for Non-humanoid Avatars

![](_page_29_Figure_2.jpeg)

□ Pre-collecting victim's information in VR

![](_page_30_Picture_0.jpeg)

### Conclusions

### Conclusion

□ Summary:

■ Propose AvatarHunter, a non-intrusive and user-unconscious de-anonymization attack in VR scenarios.

□ Leverage Unity-based feature extractor to characterize the victim's movement signature.

□ Proved to be effective and robust to various factors.

**□**Future Work

□ More universal attack scenarios.

□ Practical and useful countermeasures.

#### Conclusion

## Thank you!

![](_page_32_Picture_2.jpeg)

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